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Pollution' is a national problem that severely affects the health of
our people, the welfare of our nation, and the efficient conduct of
Copyright 1992, by LoUISL4NA LAW REvIEW.
Associate, Squire, Sanders and Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio; J.D. University of
Virginia 1986; University of Oslo, Certificate of Achievement, Oslo Norway 1981; B.S.
Howard University 1982. Special thanks to my wife, Susan, for her love, patience, and
support while I was preparing this article. The views expressed are solely those of the
author and are not intended to represent the views of Squire, Sanders and Dempsey.
1. The term "pollution" has been defined in the Clean Water Act at 33 U.S.C. §
1362(19) (1988) as "the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical,
biological, and radiological integrity of water." See also U.S. v. Ashland Oil and Transp.
Co., 364 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Ky. 1973), aff'd, 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974). However,
pollution does not entail only refuse matter but may also include a valuable resource
such as oil as explained by the Supreme Court in United States v. Standard Oil, 384
U.S. 224, 86 S. Ct. 1427 (1966). In Standard Oil, the appellant was indicted for discharging
gasoline into navigable waters in violation of the proscription in Section 13 of the Rivers
and Harbor Act of 1899. The district court dismissed the indictment on the grounds that
refuse matter did not include commercially valuable material. The Supreme Court, however,
reversed, holding that "the word refuse includes all foreign substances and pollutants"
except as provided by Section 13, "those 'flowing from streets and sewers passing therefrom
in a liquid state' into the water course." Standard Oil, 384 U.S. at 230, 86 S. Ct. at
1430.
There are other types of waste that have been disposed of in the United States and
carry different names such as sludge or solid waste, both of which were defined in the
RCRA at 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (1988). The term sludge was defined in § 6903(26A) as "any
solid, semisolid or liquid waste generated from a municipal, commercial, or industrial
waste water treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility
or any other such waste having similar characteristics and effects." Section 6903(27)
defined the term solid waste as
any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment
plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, included
solid, liquid, semisolid or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial,
commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from community activities,
but does not include solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid
or dissolved materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which
are point sources subject to permits under 1342 of Title 33, or source, special
nuclear, or by-product material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended (68 Stat. 923, 42 USC §§ 2011 et seq.).
For the purposes of this article, the term "pollution" will include solid waste, sludge,
and pollution as defined in the CWA.
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interstate commerce.' In 1984, an Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) survey reported that there were 265 million tons of hazardous
waste released in the United States each year.' Consequently, there is
now more public concern than ever before about pollution, which is
threatening our free flowing rivers, lakes, and overall environment." To
alleviate this problem, Congress has enacted many environmental sta-
tutes,' and some members of Congress have offered solutions of their
own.' In 1972, Congress enacted amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), now known as the Clean Water Act
(CWA).1 The objective of these amendments was to eliminate the dis-
charge of pollutants' into navigable waters by 1985. 9 Four years later,
Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
of 1976.10 This act was designed to be a multifaceted approach towards
solving the many problems associated with the three to four billion tons
of hazardous waste generated and discarded each year. The RCRA was
also designed to accomodate the problems resulting from the anticipated
eight percent annual increase in the volume of such waste." The gov-
ernment's inability to enforce and ultimately deter corporate violators
2. Ashland Oil. 364 F. Supp. 349.
3. Nancy E. Milsten, Note, How Well Can States Enforce Their Environmental
Laws When the Polluter is the United States Government?, 18 Rutgers L.J. 123 (1986).
citing Mary D. Worbec, Toxic Substances Control Primer: Federal Regulation of Chemicals
in the Environment 153 (1984).
4. Standard Oil, 384 U.S. at 225, 86 S. Ct. at 1428.
5. For example, see the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) (33 U.S.C.
§0 1251-1387 (1988)); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) (42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1988)); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) (15 U.S.C. 0
2601-2671 (1988)); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 00
4321-4370(a) (1988)); Clean Air Act (CAA) (42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988)); Noise Control
Act of 1972 (NCA) (42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1988)); Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988));
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) (42 U.S.C. f 300b-j(10) (1988)); and the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFCA) (7 U.S.C. § 136-136(y) (1988)).
6. An example is the solution offered by Senator Joseph Biden, Jr., of Delaware
in A New Direction for Environmental Policy: Hazardous Waste Prevention, Not Disposal,
17 Envtl. L. Rep. 10400 (Oct. 1987). Senator Biden stated that the most effective way
to deal with waste is to never create it in the first place. Here, the Senator emphasizes
the need to focus on waste minimization and prevention rather than the "end of pipe"
focus on waste disposal.
7. United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1977).
8. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
9. The term "discharge of pollutant" was defined in United States v. Frezzo Bros.,
Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1339, 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 642 F.2d 59 (3d Cis. 1981), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 829, 104 S. Ct. 106 (1981), as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source." Id.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1988).
11. See Legislative History Pub. L. No. 94-580, 2, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6239.
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of the environmental laws has, however, severely diminished the potential
effectiveness of these acts. There have been a host of enforcement
problems: unpermitted discharges, false reports, failures to report, jim-
mied automobile pollution control devices, and sales of unregistered or
mislabeled pesticides to name only a few."2 However, until recently the
only enforcement procedures available to the government were civil in
nature or carried only the threat of misdemeanor convictions."
When the lack of compliance with the environmental laws by cor-
porations can be attributed to the difficulties corporations-private and
municipal-have had organizing themselves for compliance and the dif-
ficulties of making the necessary commitments required to meet deadlines
in a timely fashion, the EPA and the Department of Justice have sought
civil penalties in the form of monetary penalties and injunctions. 4
There is, however, a second form of corporate resistance which has
involved deplorable conduct-willful, substantial, and criminal-like viol-
ations of the pollution control laws. Responding to such reprehensible
actions, the Justice Department and Congress have indicated their will-
ingness to enact stringent laws providing for the criminal prosecution
of corporate violators of environmental statutes. The purpose of this
article is to identify how the government has sought to criminally pros-
ecute corporations and corporate officials under RCRA and the CWA
and to examine the methods which the government has used and will
use to ultimately bring corporations into compliance with RCRA and
the CWA.
1. BACKGROUND TO THE ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS FACED BY THE
GOVERNMENT
Prior to 1981, the enforcement of environmental statutes and re-
gulations by prosecutors was almost exclusively through civil sanctions
and injunctive relief." Resources were budgeted only for civil enforce-
ment. Using appropriations in pursuing criminal prosecutions would have
exhausted the EPA's budget and decreased the number of civil cases
which the EPA could bring." The net effect of such a limited budget
was that the criminal provisions of environmental statutes were seldom
12. James W. Moorman, Criminal Enforcement of the Pollution Control Laws,
Environmental Enforcement: Selected Readings Prepared in Conjunction with the Seventh
Annual Conference on the Environment (ABA Standing Committee on Environmental
Law) 25 (1978).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 84-87.
14. Moorman, supra note 12, at 26.
15. Robert I. McMurry & Stephen D. Ramsey, Environmental Crime: The Use of
Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1133, 1134
(1986).
16. Id. at 1136.
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used by government officials; the EPA was more concerned with the
quantity of prosecutions than with the more effective deterrence achieved
through criminal prosecutions. 7 For instance, only fifteen criminal cases
were brought by the EPA between December 1972 and November 1974.18
The problem of enforcement was complicated further by the cor-
porate world's awareness of the financial and internal constraints on
the government. Rarely facing criminal sanctions, corporations saw fines
as a cost of doing business. Corporate officers knew that the likelihood
of getting caught was remote, since policing the activities of polluters
and registrants on a large scale was extremely difficult. 9 There was also
an array of other enforcement problems that forced the EPA to rely
primarily upon voluntary compliance by corporations or, in some cases,
upon negotiation and public pressure as means of achieving compliance. 20
In short, very little was done to compel corporate officials to comply
with environmental laws.
At the end of the Carter Administration, the criminal enforcement
of environmental laws became a focal point of the Justice Department.2'
The impetus behind the government's new willingness to prosecute en-
vironmental crimes during the 1980s was primarily the public's growing
belief that the government had no control over the disposal of the toxic
waste in America." The extent of the toxic waste problem was best
exemplified by the Assistant Attorney General, James W. Moorman (the
Justice Department official in charge of enforcing the nation's environ-
mental laws):
We do not know where the millions of tons of stuff is going.
We feel that the things that have turned up like the Love Canal
and Kin-Buc situation are simply the tip of the iceberg. We do
not have the capacity at this time to find out what is happening.
In my view, it is simply a wide open situation, like the Wild
West in the 1870's, for toxic disposal. 23
Moorman's testimony strengthened the belief that there was a real and
imminent threat to public health posed by environmental disasters. As
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1134 n.2.
19. Moorman, supra note 12, at 25.
20. United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1124 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing
Michael K. Glenn, The Crime of "Pollution": The Role of Federal Water Pollution
Criminal Sanctions, 11 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 836, 836 (1973)).
21. McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1139.
22. See Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119.
23. House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, Report on Hazardous Waste Disposal, 31, 96th Cong., 1st Sess
(1979).
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again noted by Moorman: "[E]ssentially there is very little downside
risk to anybody who illegally disposes of chemicals in such a way as
to be harmful to the public health .... The public is basically unpro-
tected. There just are not any lawmen out there, state or federal policing
the subject." 2'
To control the toxic waste disposal problem, in 1980 the Land and
Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice created the
Environmental Enforcement Section." The Section's priority soon be-
came criminal enforcement.2 6 On January 5, 1981, just one month after
the signing of the Superfund legislation, the Office of Criminal En-
forcement was created.' Its charge was to implement the EPA's com-
mitment to "actively . . . pursue criminal sanctions, [and] where
appropriate, to enhance the effectiveness of the enforcement program." 28
In October of 1982, the EPA hired its first criminal investigators. Many
of the investigators came to the EPA with a tremendous amount of
law enforcement experience with other federal agencies.2 9 The cases that
are developed by the EPA's criminal investigators are referred to the
Environmental Crimes Unit,10 which was formed with just three lawyers
in 1983. 3 The Environmental Crimes Unit organizes the national criminal
enforcement movement, leads the development of policies and training
programs, and counsels the EPA on the- targeting of investigations."
With the formation of these groups, the number of criminal pro-
secutions increased modestly. In 1980, a substantial majority of the
American public voted for President Reagan because they wanted less
regulatory constraint on business. 3 On August 14, 1981, Reagan signed
Executive Order 12316, "Responses to Environmental Damage." Pur-
suant to Section 105 of CERCLA,11 the Executive Order gave Anne
Burford, Reagan's first EPA admistrator, the duty to ensure that parties
responsible for abandoned or inoperative waste sites would clean the
24. Id.
25. McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 15. at 1140.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id., citing B. Blum, Creation of the Office of Criminal Enforcement I (unpublished
EPA internal memorandum) (Jan. 5, 1981).
29. Judson Starr, Avoiding the Government's Tough New Criminal Enforcement of
Environmental Laws 15 (presented at the American Bar Association's program on Defense
of Environmental Crimes 1989 Annual Meeting, August 9, 1989).
30. Id.
31. Donald A. Carr. Environmental Prosecution: A New World Order 3 (presented
to the American Bar Association, August 1991).
32. Starr, supra note 29. at 15.
33. Carr. supra note 31, at 6.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988).
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sites." The reason there was only a minimal increase in prosecutions
was because Burford took the reduced regulatory constraint approach
to the extreme.
On March 10, 1982, the House Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation began
an investigation to learn exactly how the EPA was addressing hazardous
waste problems.3 6 As a result of the hearings, the subcommittee rec-
ognized that hazardous waste sites were neither fully nor immediately
cleaned.3' The subcommittee also found that many of the companies
responsible for the waste were not being held fully responsible for their
share of the clean-up costs.3 For instance, in fiscal years 1983 and 1984,
there was an average of only forty indictments per year.3 9
As the economy continued to grow during the mid-1980s, several
other factors led to the increase in environmental prosecutions:
(1) Environmental groups were successful in raising money and
receiving favorable treatment from the mass media;
(2) middle and upper class Americans began to believe that more
money was needed to preserve the environment;
(3) candidate [George] Bush actively courted moderate environ-
mental groups and committed to a conservation agenda; and
(4) many catastrophic events occurred, such as the Exxon Valdez
spill. Many people also became afraid of the potential risks such
as ozone depletion and global climate change.46
Former Assistant Attorney General Donald A. Carr noted, "As a result
of this confluence of trends there is unquestionably broad support at
present for the concept of a 'hang em high' approach to environmental
prosecution. "' In fiscal year 1987, there were 127 indictments, nearly
tripling the number in the previous year. In fiscal year 1988, there were
eighty-six guilty pleas and convictions, and in fiscal year 1989, there
were 107 convictions with fines totaling over twelve million dollars. 2 In
fiscal year 1990, there were thirty-three percent more indictments than
the previous year. These indictments resulted in a ninety-five percent
conviction rate. Fifty-five percent of those convicted were sentenced to
35. Ronald L. Clareloux, Note, The Conflict Between Executive Privilege and Con-
gressional Oversight: The Gorsuch Controversy, 1983 Duke L.J. 1333, 1335 (1983).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1335-36.
38. Id. at 1336.
39. Carr, supra note 31.
40. Id. at 6.
41. Id. at 7.
42. These figures were obtained from the Department of Justice's Environmental
Crimes Section.
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jail time.' 3 As of January 1991, the Environmental Crimes Section, since
its formation, had returned 761 indictments, resulting in 549 convictions.
Over fifty-seven million dollars in penalties had been assessed and more
than 348 years of jail time had been imposed."
Over the next decade, members of the corporate community should
expect those numbers to dramatically increase. In 1990, Congress passed
the Pollution Prosecution Act (PPA).41 In discussions on the PPA,
Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut noted that having tough laws
and regulations in place on environmental compliance is only part of
the solution; a critical element of ensuring compliance is an effective
enforcement system."4 He noted that part of the problem was that cases
were investigated by the EPA only after the violations were uncovered
and the harm was done. The result has been that the EPA has been
reacting rather than focusing on suspected wrongdoing." He further
reasoned that by hiring more criminal investigators, the EPA would be
able to prosecute cases that would have greater deterrent value." Lie-
berman stated:
The backbone of EPA's criminal enforcement program is its
investigators, who provide EPA with the ability to collect evi-
dence about environmental violations. Yet, unbelievably, EPA
has only approximately 50 criminal investigators throughout the
Nation-in essence, less than one investigator for each State.
Some individual States have devoted almost that many investi-
gators to enforcement of state criminal environmental laws. And
other law enforcement agencies, such as the Fish and Wildlife
Service, have more than four times the number of investigators
which EPA has."'
The PPA calls for the EPA to have at least seventy-two criminal
investigators by the end of fiscal year 1991, 110 by the end of fiscal
year 1992, 123 by the end of fiscal year 1993, 160 by the end of fiscal
year 1994, and not less than 200 criminal investigators by the end of
fiscal year 1995." The role of the investigators will include tracking
down witnesses and providing critical support for court cases.'
43. Dick Thornburg, Attorney General of the United States, Our Blue Planet: A Law
Enforcement Challenge at 4 (Keynote Address to the 1991 Environmental Law Enforcement
Conference, New Orleans. La., Jan. 8, 1991) (transcript available from the United States
Department of Justice).
44. Id. at 5.
45. Polution Prosecution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-593, 104 Stat. 2962 (1990).
46. 136 Cong. Rec. S12273 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990) (statement of Sen. Lieberman).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at, 512274.
51. Pub. L. No. 101-593; 104 Stat. 2%2.
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II. PuRiPosE BE1tND CR NAL ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
Without a doubt, the primary purpose for imposing criminal sanc-
tions on environmental law violators is deterrence 2 and rehabilitation
of company personnel. Corporations who were not deterred by civil
sanctions fear criminal prosecutions, and the threat of jail time sends
a clear message to corporate executives that they are not immune to
criminal sanctions." As noted by Joseph Block, Chief of the Environ-
mental Crimes Division of the Department of Justice, "[I]ncarceration
is the one cost of business that you can't pass to the consumer."' 4
Similarly, as Peter Beeson, formerly with the Department of Justice,
explained, "[Prosecution may be more effective for crime in the suites
that it is for crime in the streets: 'Deterrence works best on people who
have not had contact with criminal justice and for whom prosecution
or even investigation will have severe personal consequences."'"
There are many reasons for supporting the use of criminal sanctions.
Imprisoning corporate officials avoids the conception that the wealthy
can avoid jail by paying insignificant fines.16 Imposing criminal sanctions
on high level corporate officers indicates a public policy that the powerful
have a great responsibility to society and, when they fail to meet their
obligations, they should be subject to serious sanctions." The Justide
Department contends that the reason corporations must be criminally
punished for environmental wrongs is that many corporations knowingly
refuse to take the appropriate action to correct or remedy a problem.
At the same time, the Justice Department is aware that most noncom-
pliance by corporations and corporate officials results from the lack of
corporate organization and from the lack of appropriate procedures
designed to meet deadlines in a timely fashion." Therefore, so long as
a good faith effort is made by the corporation or corporate officials
to comply with the environmental laws,' 9 the Justice Department usually
seeks civil remedies in the form of monetary penalties and injunctions.'0
52. Joseph F. DiMerno, Environmental Law and American Business: Dilemmas of
Compliance 42-43 (1986).
53. Id.
54. Office of Legal Education, Environmental Law Conference, Oct. 11-13, Wash-
ington, D.C. 1989.
55. DiMento, supra note 52, at 43, quoting from Wendy Greidor, Fines Aren't
Enough: Send Corporate Polluters to Jail, Rolling Stone, Mar. 29, 1984, at 10.
56. Id. at 44.
57. Id.
58. Moorman, supra note 12, at 26.
59. Criminal Environmental Enforcement at Federal Facilities: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazardous Materials Committee on Energy and
Commerce of the House Comm. (1989) (statement of Richard B. Stewart, Assistant
Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division).
60. Moorman, supra note 12, at 26.
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The Justice Department, however, has determined that criminal sanc-
tions are more appropriate than civil sanctions when there are egregious
and substantial violations of the environmental laws.6 1 In considering
criminal prosecutions, the Justice Department has examined several fac-
tors over the years, including:
(1) the gravity and extent of any health or environmental impact
(actual or potential) of the conduct in question;
(2) the timeliness and degree of disclosure made to the regulatory
authorities;
(3) the timeliness and degree of efforts made to control the
problem or to mitigate its effects;
(4) any history of recurrent or persistent violations by the cor-
poration, or a corporate image for "bad faith" or recidivism;
and
(5) evidence of intentional corporate noncompliance as a result
of an informed policy decision. 62
In other words, the Justice Department usually considers the harm caused
to the public and to the environment,63 such as the type of discharge
(e.g., carcinogens or toxins), 64 or whether there were problems with
reporting or disclosure.65 Particularly egregious acts have usually received
wide-spread recognition and publicity. Because of the public exposure
from the prosecution of such egregious cases, criminal sanctions under
those circumstances were seen not only as good government but as good
politics."
III. THE CLEAN WATER ACT
A. General History
Although most of the criminal environmental statutes and amend-
ments are relatively new, 6' all of them developed from a long and rich
61. Norton F. Tennille, Jr., Criminal Prosecution of Individuals: A New Trend in
Federal Environmental Enforcement? 20 (Selected Readings Prepared in Conjunction with
the Seventh Annual Conference on the Environment, ABA Standing Committee on En-
vironmental Law) (1978).
62. Id. at 21-22.
63. Moorman, supra note 12, at 27.
64. Id.
65. Tennille, supra note 61, at 21.
66. McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1144.
67. For example, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act was initially passed
in 1976, the Noise Control Act was passed in 1972, CERCLA became law in 1980, and
the Clean Air Act became law in 1977.
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tradition of legislative history.6 The Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA)
and other water acts are the impetus behind many of these laws. As
early as 1886, an act was passed making it a crime to empty "any
ballast, stone, slate, gravel, earth, slack, rubbish, wreck, filth, slabs,
edgings, sawdust, slag or cinders or other refuse or mill-waste of any
kind into New York Harbor." 69 Eight years later, another act was passed
extending the reach of the 1886 act to prohibit deposits of "any other
matter of any kind, other than that flowing from streets, sewers, and
passing therefrom in a liquid state" into harbors and rivers for which
Congress had appropriated money. Finally in 1899, Congress combined
these two statutes with two other statutes 0 and passed Section 13 of
the RHA.71 This act provided that it was unlawful to throw, discharge,
or deposit any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other
than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a
liquid state into the navigable waters of the United States.72 As outlined
in United States v. Standard oil,71 the purpose of the RHA was no
more than an attempt to consolidate these prior acts into one relatively
comprehensive act. The RHA was concerned with protecting fish, wild-
life, and the environment, keeping them as free from pollution as
possible. 4 Both the legislature and the courts found that criminally
prosecuting violators was an effective way of achieving this goal. The
criminal prosecution of polluters was an approach that continued into
the twentieth century. 75
68. See supra note 1.
69. Standard Oil, 384 U.S. at 226, 86 S. Ct. at 1422, citing 24 Stat. 329 (1886).
70. Id. at 227, 86 S. Ct. at 1429, citing 28 Stat. 363 (1894). The Standard Oil court
cited two other early acts passed by Congress in anticipation of water pollution being a
potential problem. In 1888, an act was implemented to prevent obstructive and injurious
deposits into the New York Harbor and adjacent waters, and to ban the discharge of
refuse, dirt, ashes, cinders, mud, sand, dredgings, sludge, acid or any other matter of
any kind other than that flowing from streets, sewers, and passing therefrom in a liquid
state. Id., citing 25 Stat. 209 (1888). An 1890 act made it unlawful to empty into navigable
waters "any ballast, stone, slate, gravel, earth rubbish, wreck, filth, slabs, edgings, sawdust,
slag, cinders, ashes, refuse, or other waste of any kind ... which shall tend to impede
or obstruct navigation." Id., citing 26 Stat. 453 (1890). Each of the acts made it a crime
to illegally discharge valuable material as well.
71. Rivers and Harbor Act, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (1899) (current version at 33 U.S.C.
§ 407 (1988)), provides in part:
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit ... any refuse matter of
any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers
and passing therefrom in a liquid state into any navigable water of the United
States.
Id.
72. Id.
73. Standard Oil, 384 U.S. 224, 86 S. Ct. 1427.
74. Holden v. United States, 24 App. D.C. 318 (D.C. Cir. 1904).
75. The Holden court was called on to determine the criminal liability of a supervisor
[Vol. 53
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Even activities that appeared to be accidental faced prosecution.
Hegglund v. United States7, 6 demonstrates how stringently criminal stan-
dards were applied against corporate officials. In Hegglund, the master
of a motor tankship Bidwell, owned by Sun Oil Company, was convicted
for discharging oil and permitting it to be discharged from his ship into
the Calcasieu River in Louisiana in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 431 et.
seq. On appeal, Hegglund's main contentions were that the act only
prohibited intentional discharges of oil, and alternatively that the evi-
dence did not show that he was negligent, rather that the escape of the
oil was an unavoidable accident. Under 33 U.S.C. § 433, one exception
to the imposition of criminal liability is provided "in case[s] of emergency
imperiling life or property, or unavoidable accident, collision, or strand-
ing and except as otherwise permitted by regulations." The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's conviction and held that if the escape of oil
could have been foreseen or prevented, then the conviction would stand.
The court reasoned that:
[I]f the Bidwell was a tight ship, duly inspected, and loaded
without any previous reason to expect that oil would be dis-
charged from her but that it did leak out unavoidably from
some accidental or unknown cause, there would be a discharge
through unavoidable accident. But if she was known to be likely
of the Washington Gas Company who either directly or indirectly discharged oil and tar
in the Potomac River in violation of Section 901 of the D.C. Code. Id. at 322. Section
901 provided:
Deposits of Deleterious Matter.-No person shall allow any tar, oil, ammoniacal
liquor, or other waste products of any gas works or works engaged in using
such products, or any waste product whatever of any mechanical, chemical,
manufacturing, or refining, establishment, to flow into or be deposited in Rock
Creek or Potomac River, or any of its tributaries within the District of Columbia
or conduit leading to the same.
The defendant in Holden argued that the only matter discharged into the Potomac
was water-based, and assuming arguendo that tar had been deposited into the river, the
small amount of tar was so de minimus that it would not meet the standards required
by Section 901. The court rejected this argument and determined that even if there was
only a small discharge of coal into the river, the intent of Congress was to punish all
who polluted navigable waters. Here, the court held:
It was the manifest object of Congress, not simply to provide for the protection
of the fish in the river, but for keeping the waters of the streams in the District
as free from pollution as possible. Hence, it was declared by the statute that
no person shall allow any tar, oil, ammoniacal liquor, or other waste products
to flow into, or be deposited in, the rivers mentioned, or any of the tributaries,
or into any pipe conduit leading to the same. The prohibition, therefore, is
general and applies to all alike. There can be no question of the power of
Congress over the subject.
76. 100 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1938).
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to leak when loaded, the master could not claim an unavoidable
accident when she did thus leak.
77
The prosecution contended that the ship was known to the master to
be a leaky vessel, and that the defendant willfully loaded her, taking
the chance of her leaking again. The master, however, argued that all
riveted tankers are liable to leak through the strains put on the hull in
discharging the water ballast and pumping in the oil, and that in this
instance the escape of oil was due to unavoidable accident. The court
in affirming the conviction noted:
While there was evidence to sustain the master's contention,
there was also sufficient evidence to justify a contrary finding.
Some of the witnesses, indeed say that all riveted tankers some-
time leak, and the leaking is unavoidable, but this is contradicted
by the experience of the Sun Oil Company, which has seventeen
riveted tankers in service. Fifteen of them have not leaked. One
has leaked once. The seventeenth, the Bidwell, now seventeen
years old, has been reported as leaking and had been repaired
either twice or thrice just previously to the occasion prosecuted
for. Error is assigned on the admission of this evidence, but
the evidence is clearly relevant and weighty. She was certainly
leaking on both sides on the day in question. It is testified that
the master remarked that she had been leaking during the five
years he had commanded her. The Government witnesses say
that riveted tankers do not generally leak. The Bidwell could
be found to be a leaky ship, known as such to the master.
7
This strict doctrine of criminal liability for environmental statutes was
expanded even further in The President Coolidge.79 In The President
Coolidge, the appellants were convicted of violating 33 U.S.C. § 407
which made it unlawful to throw, discharge or deposit, either directly
or indirectly, any refuse matter into any navigable water of the United
States. What made this case so unique was that the defendant argued
that it not only lacked the intent to discharge refuse, but that the owners
and officers of the vessel had given express orders to its crew about
the prohibition of dumping matter into the waters. The Ninth Circuit
still held the ship accountable for its crew members' actions and for
failing to prevent the commission of the forbidden act.8°
The purpose of Section 13 of the RHA was obvious-to attempt
to challenge any type of behavior which could pollute the waters. Con-
77. Id. at 70.
78. Id.
79. The President Coolidge. Dollar S.S. Co. v. United States, 101 F.2d 638 (9th Cir.
1939).
80. Id.
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gress and the courts justified their actions by reasoning that criminal
environmental statutes were intended to protect the public interest8 and,
therefore, should be classified as "public welfare statutes. '" ' Conse-
quently, the RHA was classified as a public welfare statute. This clas-
sification justified Congress' belief that the standard of criminal liability
should be less stringent than that applied in most criminal statutes.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the federal govern-
ment was prepared to prosecute anyone who discharged pollutants into
the waters under the RHA. However, during the mid-twentieth century,
an entirely different approach was taken. The approach virtually elim-
inated the use of the criminal provisions in water discharge cases. With
the enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)
in 1948, the government refocused its energy towards enforcing its
provisions through the application of civil restraints." Little thought was
given to using the criminal provisions of either the environmental statutes
or traditional law.4
Initially, criminal prosecutions were only brought under the FWPCA
in unusual circumstances-either when compliance efforts revealed par-
ticularly outrageous or especially culpable behavior, when the entity
refused to cooperate, or when the circumstances aroused unusual vigi-
lance on the part of enforcement authorities. One such egregious case
was United States v. Frezzo Brothers, Inc." In Frezzo Brothers, Guido
and James Frezzo, were engaged in mushroom manufacturing and were
convicted on six counts of willfully and negligently discharging a polluting
compost into White Clay Creek in violation of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a)
and 1319(c). Specifically, the Frezzo's farm had a 114,000-gallon holding
tank designed to contain water run-off from compost wharves and to
recycle water back to the farm. The government, however, alleged that
the holding tank was too small to contain the compost waste after a
rainstorm and that the Frezzos had negligently discharged pollutants
81. United States v. The Catherine, 212 F.2d 89. 91-92 (4th Cir. 1954).
82. United States v. Ouelette, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20899 (E.D. Ark.
Sept. 19. 1977); see also F. Henry Habicht, The Federal Perspective on Environmental
Criminal Enforcement: How to Remain on the Civil Side, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10478, 10482 n.35 (Dec. 1987), where the author, citing Ouelette. noted:
Historically, courts have held that statutes which proscribe common law offenses
require specific intent as an essential element. However, in recent years a growing
number of statutes have been enacted to proscribe what have been termed
"public welfare offense." Due to the "very different antecedents and origins"
of these statutes, courts have generally refused to infer specific intent as an
essential element.
83. United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1124 (3d Cir. 1979).
84. McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1134.
85. 461 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1074, 100 S. Ct. 1020 (1980).
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into the stream on two different dates. The government further alleged
that these actions were willful because a high concentration of compost
was found in the creek on three other occasions when there was no
evidence of rain. On appeal, the defendants argued that the evidence
presented was insufficient as a matter of law to convict them. The Third
Circuit disagreed, noting that "[t]he jury was entitled to infer from the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the discharges that a willful
act precipitated them. The Government did not have to present evidence
of someone turning on a valve or diverting waste in order to establish
a willful violation of the act.""6 The defendant's conviction for negli-
gently maintaining inadequate tanks was affirmed on the sufficiency of
the evidence presented by the government.17
In 1972, Congress dramatically amended the approach of the FWPCA.
Under the 1948 version of the FWPCA, the concentration was primarily
on the water quality control standards." The 1972 amendments to the
FWPCA focused upon discharge control mechanisms." By focusing on
the discharge rather than the water quality, Congress recognized the
need to deter corporations and corporate officers from violating the
laws simply as a cost of doing business. Congress stated that the 1948
version of the FWPCA provided sanctions that were wholly inadequate
to encourage compliance. Under the 1972 amendments, the corporation
or corporate officer was subject to $25,000 per day per violation and/
or up to one year in jail for "knowing violations" of the FWPCA °
For second convictions, the potential penalties doubled to up to $50,000
per day per violation and two years in jail.9" In enacting the increased
86. Frezzo Bros.; 602 F.2d at 1129.
87. The government proved the willfulness of the conduct by relying on the samples
collected, the absence of rain on those dates, and the elimination of other possible causes
for the pollution. The trial judge noted:
Testimony was presented by several witnesses that on many occasions, com-
mencing as far back as 1970. the defendants in this case had been investigated,
visited, and confronted by a number of state and county employees concerning
the fact that the stream in question was being polluted by runoff from the
compost operation being conducted by the defendants on the Frezzo property.
Frezzo Bros.. 461 F. Supp. at 270. The appellate court held:
The government's theory ... was that the discharges were negligently caused
by the inadequate capacity of the holding tank .... The jury could properly
have concluded that the water pollution abatement facilities were negligently
maintained by the Frezzos and were insufficient to prevent discharges of the
wastes. We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the
verdict ....
Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d at 1129.
88. Legislative History Pub. L. No. 92-500, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3669.
89. Id. at 3671.
90. Id. at 3731.
91. Id.
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criminal sanctions, Congress concluded that "if the timetables established
throughout the Act are to be met, the threat of sanction must be real,
and enforcement provisions must be swift and direct. Abatement orders,
penalty provisions, and rapid access to the Federal District Court should
accomplish the objective of compliance. 92
In 1977, Congress renamed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
as the Clean Water Act (CWA), 93 and changed the regulatory focus to
rigorous control of toxic pollutants." The CWA was enacted to restore
and maintain the chemical and biological integrity of the nation's wa-
ters." It was under these circumstances that the criminal provisions of
the FWPCA began to take shape. Although as noted earlier, it was not
until some five years later that Congress appropriated money to crim-
inally enforce the laws on the books.
B. "Negligence" or Knowledge Required Under the CWA
Intent is not required to convict a corporate official under the Clean
Water Act. Under the CWA, a conviction can occur if a corporate
official was negligent. While the possibility of being convicted for neg-
ligently polluting the waters has been a part of the law for years, the
penalties for criminally violating the CWA have changed dramatically.
Prior to 1987, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) provided:
[AJny person who willfully or negligently violates section 1311,
1312, 1315, 1317, or 1318 of this title, or any permit condition
or limitation implementing any of such sections in a permit
issued under section 1342 of this title by the Administrator or
by a State or in a permit issued under 1344 of this title by a
State, shall be punished by a fine of not less that $2,500 nor
more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment
for not more than one year or both.96
In 1987, Congress amended the CWA with the Water Quality Act."
The 1987 amendment placed criminal, knowing violations and negligent
violations into two separate categories. These two categories of violations
are subject to different penalties." For negligent discharges, the penalties
92. Id.
93. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33 USC §§ 1251 et
seq. (1988)).
94. J. Gordon Arbuckle et al., Environmental Law Handbook 177 (10th ed. 1989).
95. United States v. Marathon Dev. Corp., 867 F.2d 96 (Ist Cir. 1989).
96. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(cXI) (1972) (emphasis added).
97. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 33 US.C. (1988)).
98. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1988) provides criminal penalties for negligent violations
of the Act, and 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1988) provides criminal penalties for knowing
violations.
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remained the same as they had been under the previous section. 99 Yet,
the penalties for a knowing violation increased to a doubling of the
daily fine amount and/or imprisonment for up to three years." With
the increase in penalties for knowing violations of the CWA and the
expansion of criminally negligent violations, Congress concentrated on
improving water quality in areas where mere compliance with nationwide
minimum discharge standards did not necessarily meet the CWA's water
quality goals.' 0'
In express language, the CWA now states that pollution into nav-
igable waters is forbidden unless the polluter has obtained a permit
from the government.' 2 The corporate official or corporation may be
convicted'0 3 if it is proven that the defendant did not have a permit to
discharge the pollutant.1°4 The statute does not require that the official
or corporation intend a criminal act in order to be convicted of a
statutory violation. The CWA only requires that the defendant negligently
commit the act in question. 05 The amendment which made negligent
actions a separate criminal violation from a knowing violation under
the CWA indicates that Congress is determined to deter and severely
punish water pollution activities that are made as corporate business
decisions.
C. The CWA's "Knowing Endangerment" Statute
In 1987, Congress enacted a nearly identical version of RCRA's
knowing endangerment statute under the CWA.1'6 Like RCRA, the CWA
provides that if a person "knows at the time that he places another
person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury [the violator]
shall be subject to a fine, not more than $250,000 or imprisonment for
not more than 15' years or both."'10 In the CWA context, knowing
endangerment becomes an issue where: (1) water supplies are contam-
inated, (2) pretreatment requirements for toxics are deliberately violated,
or (3) hazardous substances are dumped in sewers or waterways instead
of being sent to a proper treatment, storage, and disposal facility under
RCRA.' °8 Although there is little guidance on the interpretation of the
99. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1988).
100. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1988).
101. Arbuckle, supra note 94, at 228.
102. United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 546 F. Supp. 713, 721 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
103. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) and 1319(c).
104. United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 266, 272 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
105. Id.
106. Arbuckle, supra note 94, at 228.
107. See Legislative History of Water Quality Act, § 312, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1988)).
108. Arbuckle, supra note 94, at 228.
[Vol. 53
CWA/RCRA-CORPORA TE CULPABILITY
CWA's knowing endangerment provision, other CWA criminal cases
seem to indicate that corporations can be vicariously convicted under
the CWA's knowing endangerment statute as well. For example, in Apex
Oil Co. v. United States, 0 9 a corporation was engaged in transporting
fuel oil and was convicted for failing to notify the United States gov-
ernment of a known spill in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5). The
appellant argued that only an individual or natural person and not a
corporation could be a person in charge within the meaning of the
statute. Hence, it could not be prosecuted. The Eighth Circuit, however,
reasoned:
Indeed, such a construction of the statute would, in the case
of a corporation bent upon evading the civil penalty of 1321(b)(6),
provide an incentive not to report all small spills that are not
likely to be detected or traced to their origin. It would pit the
employee, on the pain of fine or conviction under 1321(b)(5),
against his employer. The appellant's contention is counterpro-
ductive to the purposes of the Act." 0
The court in Apex Oil held that "the corporation is no less 'in charge'
of the oil facility than its employee. Further, the knowledge of the
employees is the knowledge of the corporation.""'
The Apex Oil reasoning was supported three years later in United
States v. Little Rock Sewer Committee,"2 where a voluntary board was
charged with making a false statement, representation, and certification
in a monthly Discharge Monitoring Report in violation of old 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(c)(2). The court noted that the Little Rock Sewer Committee
was composed of five individuals who were appointed by the City of
Little Rock's Board of Directors. The sewer plant superintendent was
convicted of knowingly making false statements of material fact in a
discharge monitoring report required to be filed with the EPA, and the
issue presented was whether the committee could be held criminally liable
for violation of the statute under a theory of respondeat superior. The
Arkansas District Court, citing Apex Oil, recognized that "[b]ecause of
the broad language of the court's decision in Apex regarding the im-
putation of knowledge in a criminal case to the corporation, that decision
could arguably be cited as authority for the proposition that the knowl-
edge of even a low echelon employee may be imputed to the corpo-
ration."' 3
109. Apex Oil, 530 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827, 97 S. Ct.
84 (1976).
110. Id. at 1293 (footnotes omitted).
111. Id. at 1295 (citation omitted).
112. 460 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
113. Id. at 9.
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The court distinguished Apex Oil by noting that the official convicted
in the Little Rock Sewer case was not a low echelon employee but
rather a high level supervisor. Therefore, reliance on the principle pro-
nounced in Apex Oil was unnecessary. Finally, the defendants argued
that they should not be held vicariously liable because, unlike the in-
dividuals involved in Apex Oil, they were civic minded individuals that
were not in business for profit. The district court, however, determined
that the board stood to benefit financially if in no other manner than
from the reduced cost of operation resulting from the failure to take
those steps and make those expenditures necessary to operate the facility
in compliance with the standards. Concerning the issue of the board
members being civic minded individuals serving on the board without
compensation, the court held:
The evidence sustains this point, but it is essentially irrelevant
to the question of the guilt or innocence of the named defendant.
It must again be emphasized that the legal entity known as the
Sewer Committee is the defendant, and it, not the individual
members of the "Board," has been found guilty of violating
the aforementioned statute."
4
Both the Congress and the courts have found this interpretation necessary
to curb and ultimately deter corporate violations of the CWA.
D. Other Issues Raised Under the CWA
Many other issues have been raised under the criminal provisions
of the CWA. The issues have all been resolved with one objective focus
in mind-corporations and corporate officers will no longer be allowed
to destroy the environment as a cost of doing business. If they do so,
criminal penalties will follow.
1. The Prerequisite of Civil Action Prior to Criminal Action
According to Section 309(a)(3) of the CWA, criminal penalties can
be imposed without a civil warning first being issued." 5 Section 309(a)(3)
sets forth two courses of action which are open to the Administrator
114. Id. at 10.
115. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) states in pertinent part:
Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the Administrator
finds that any person is in violation of 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, or 1345
of this title, or is in violation of any ... permit issued under section 1342 of
this title by him or by a State or in a permit issued under section 1344 of this
title by a State, he shall issue an order requiring such person to comply with
such section or requirement, or he shall bring a civil action in accordance with
subsection (b) of this section.
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of the EPA when he becomes aware of a violation of the CWA. The
Administrator must either file a civil action against the person he believes
to be a violator or give such person an abatement order." 6 However,
there is conflicting legislative history with respect to whether a compliance
order or a civil suit by the Administrator is a prerequisite to the
government's institution of criminal proceedings. '17 In House debate,
Representative Harsha indicated that the issuance of an abatement order
was a necessary condition to the filing of a criminal action."' This view
was also expressed in the Senate's consideration of the conference com-
mittee report where Senator Muskie acknowledged, "It is important to
note however, that the provisions requiring the Administrator to issue
an abatement order whenever there is a violation were mandatory in
both the Senate bill and the House amendment, and the Conference
agreement contemplates that the Administrator's duty to issue an abate-
ment order remains a mandatory one."''1 9
Yet, the final House Committee Report clearly indicated that while
the Administrator must act in the case of any violations, he has alter-
native methods of responding either by civil or criminal proceedings.1'2
The key portion of the House Committee Report provides:
Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the
Administrator finds that anyone is in violation of any of these
requirements, he may take any of the following enforcement
actions: (1) he shall issue an order requiring compliance; (2) he
shall notify the person in alleged violation in such State of such
finding . . . or (3) he shall bring a civil action; or (4) he shall
cause to be instituted criminal proceedings.'
116. Id.; United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1183 (D. Ariz.
1975).
117. United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1979).
118. Phelps Dodge, 391 F. Supp. at 1183; here Representative Harsha stated:
Assuming there was some discharge of pollutants contrary to this act and the
Administrator notified the violating party as he is required under this act and
told him what he was doing wrong and told him where it was happening, and
ordered the violator to stop, and if the polluter did not obey that order, then
the polluter becomes a willful violator and can be [criminally] charged under
this section as a willful violator.
See also Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d at 1126.
119. Phelps Dodge, 391 F. Supp. at 1184; Frez.zo Bros., 602 F.2d at 1126, citing A
Legislative History of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
U.S. Government Printing Office at 174.
120. Phelps Dodge, 391 F. Supp. at 1184; Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d at 1126.
121. Phelps Dodge, 391 F. Supp. at 1184; Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d at 1126, quoting
A Legislative History of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
U.S. Government Printing Office at 114; see also United States v. Hudson Farms, 12
ERC 1144, 1146 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
19921
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
In short, there is nothing in the text of Section 309(c) which compels
the conclusion that prior written notice or other administrative or civil
remedies are prerequisites to criminal sanctions under the CWA.'2 The
Senate acceded to the House in not making civil enforcement mandatory
upon the Administrator under Section 309. 23 Therefore, the Adminis-
trator is not required to institute a civil action first and to order a
correction by civil means before instituting criminal penalties.' 24
2. Defining "Navigable Waters"
Under the CWA, much of the focus concerning criminal liability
has also been on determining what constitutes "navigable waters." Con-
gress did not explicitly define the term "waters of the United States. ' ' 2,
Yet, to implicitly determine the meaning of the questioned criminal
provision, one needs to go no further than the definitions provided in
the CWA itself. 2 6 Congress defined the phrase "navigable waters" as
broadly as possible. This is best illustrated in United States v. Ashland
Oil and Transportation Co. 27 In Ashland Oil, the defendant corporation
was convicted for failing "immediately" to report the discharge of 3200
gallons of oil into the water of Little Cypress Creek on February 20,
1973. Little Cypress Creek was a tributary to the Pond River, and the
Pond River was a tributary to the Green River. The Green River is
navigable in fact at the point that the Pond River empties into it. Both
the government and the defendants stipulated that only the Green River,
and not the Pond River, was actually a navigable river in fact in terms
of waterborne commerce. Here, Ashland Oil Company on appeal claimed
that Congress did not have the Constitutional power to control the
pollution of nonnavigable tributaries of navigable streams and that Con-
gress had not sought to do so in the statute. In upholding the conviction,
the Sixth Circuit held:
Obviously water pollution is a health threat to the water supply
of the nation. It endangers our agriculture by rendering water
unfit for irrigation. It can end the public use and enjoyment
of our magnificent rivers and lakes for fishing, for boating, and
for swimming. These health and welfare concerns are, of course,
proper subjects for Congressional attention because of the many
impacts upon interstate commerce generally. But water pollution
122. Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d at 1126.
123. Id.
124. Phelps Dodge, 391 F. Supp. at 1184.
125. Id.
126. United States v. Ashland Oil and Transp. Co., 364 F. Supp. 349, 350 (W.D.
Ky. 1973), aff'd, 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
127. 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
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is also a direct threat to navigation-the first interstate commerce
system in this country's history and still a very important one.'28
Similarly, in Phelps Dodge,19 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss
an indictment for illegally polluting navigable waters. There, the defen-
dants asserted that the phrase "waters of the United States" as used
in the CWA was unconstitutionally vague and indefinite because it failed
to give a fair warning of conduct that was criminal. Therefore, the
appellants argued that the statute violated the Fifth Amendment. The
district court rejected this argument and, like the court in Ashland Oil,
noted:
the Supreme Court is less inclined to strike down a congressional
enactment on "vagueness" if it involves regulatory measures
than it is if constitutionally protected acts or conduct of indi-
viduals are involved.
The term "waters of the United States" as used in the context
of the Act and in keeping with the legislative intent means just
what it says: "all waters of the United States including the
territorial seas." 130
The courts have since expanded the phrase "navigable waters" in
criminal cases to include wetlands which are defined as "areas inundated
or saturated with ground water including swamps, marshes and bogs."' 3 '
The courts have also interpreted criminal violations under the CWA like
its predecessor, the FWPCA, and included streams that were not nav-
igable in fact.' 2 One court even noted that the CWA's "legislative
history makes it clear that the term [navigable waters], should be given
the broadest possible constitutional interpretation."'' 33
3. Individuals Subject to Prosecution
Although Congress was concerned with deterring corporations and
corporate officers from polluting the nation's waterways, Congress also
wanted to make sure that only those individuals with the ability and
authority to prevent discharges into the waterways would be prosecuted.
To the extent that guidance can be obtained from the legislative history,
33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) suggests that liability is to be limited to those
128. Id. at 1325-26.
129. Phelps Dodge, 391 F. Supp. 1181.
130. Id. at 1185.
131. United States v. Key West Towers, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
132, United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Prod., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 852 (E.D.
Pa. 1980).
133. Id. at 855, quoting Sen. Rep. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3776, 3822.
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responsible for a facility or vessel."14 Under the CWA, the person must
have the capacity to make timely discovery of discharges and have the
authority or power to direct the activities of persons who control the
mechanisms causing the pollution. 3 In short, the person must have the
capacity to prevent or abate damage.'
3 6
This rule only protects individuals. It does not eliminate the criminal
vicarious liability of a corporation. While the legislative history of the
FWPCA of 1972 and its amendments offers little real help with respect
to the vicarious liability of corporations for the acts of its employees, 37
it is reasonable to assume that, like the knowing endangerment provision,
Congress intended to impose vicarious liability upon corporations as
"owners" for the acts of their employees. Again, such vicarious liability
is designed to assure compliance with the Act by employees of the
company. 38
IV. THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT
A. General History
Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) as a "cradle to grave" regulatory scheme which would provide
"nationwide protection against the dangers of hazardous waste dis-
posal. '" 9 The committee reports accompanying the legislative consid-
eration of RCRA contained numerous statements indicating the
Congressional view that improper disposal of toxic materials was a
serious problem.'40 The original 1976 RCRA statute made the knowing
disposal (but not treatment or storage) of toxic materials without a
permit a misdemeanor. '4' However, with the widespread negative publicity
134. Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1291, 1294 (8th Cir.), cert. deniked, 429
U.S. 827, 97 S. Ct. 84 (1976).
135. Id. at 1293, citing United States v. Mobil Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th
Cir. 1972).
136. Id.
137. United States v. Little Rock Sewer Committee, 460 F. Supp. 6, 8 (E.D. Ark.
1978).
138. Id.
139. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1491, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 11. (1972), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6249; United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 667
(3d Cir. 1984).
140. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 667-68.
141. Legislative History Pub. L. No. 96-510, 17. See also Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 3008(d), 90 Stat. 2795, 2812 (1976); Johnson
& Towers, 741 F.2d at 668.
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given to sites such as Love Canal in New York and the Chemical
Control site in New Jersey, the government knew that swift, strong
action had to be taken against corporate polluters. 42
Amendments made in 1980 to the 1976 Act expanded the criminal
provisions of RCRA to cover both treatment and storage of hazardous
materials, and a violation of the criminal provisions became a felony.
43
The 1980 RCRA Amendments ,were significant in that they established
the first felony sanctions for any federal environmental crime'" and the
enactment of the first "endangerment" offense under federal law. 14 The
broad expansion of the penalties under RCRA was essential to provide
a wide variety of mechanisms to stop the illegal disposal of hazardous
waste.'"
B. "Knowledge" Required Under RCRA
Virtually every environmental statute now provides for some form
of criminal liability. 14 Yet, it is the amendments to both RCRA and
the CWA which indicate Congress' intention to stringently enforce the
criminal provisions of these and other environmental statutes.'" RCRA
recognizes two types of criminal actions-knowing actions and knowing
endangerment. What constitutes "knowledge" under RCRA for purposes
of criminal liability is probably the most confusing aspect of the Act.
The definition of "knowledge" changes dramatically depending upon
how the issue is approached and who makes the interpretation.
In 1980, Congresswoman Barbara Mikulski of Maryland proposed
an increase in the criminal penalty for violating RCRA from a mis-
demeanor to a felony. In doing so, Mikulski noted that "[d]esignating
violations of RCRA as felonies will give us the deterrent we need.
Violators will be more likely to be caught and prosecuted if my amend-
ment is adopted because of the greater priority given to felonious of-
fenses."' 49 According to Mikulski, the amendment was recommended by
the Justice Department, which agreed that if the crime was deemed a
felony, the statute would serve as a greater deterrent and would make
142. See Christopher Harris et al., Criminal Liability for Violations of Federal Haz-
ardous Waste Law: The "Knowledge" of Corporations and Their Executives, 23 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 203 (1988).
143. Infra note 150.
144. Id.
145. Infra notes 180-206.
146. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1491, supra note 139, at 6269; Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d
at 667.
147. Arbuckle, supra note 94, at 176.
148. Id. at 61.
149. 126 Cong. Rec. H3367 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1980) (statement of Rep. Mikulski).
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chief executive officers more prudent in governing their companies. 150
Furthermore, the Department of Justice believed that by increasing the
penalty to a felony, the Department would receive more enforcement
assistance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Congressman Florio
of New Jersey stated that "[t]he FBI either has an official policy or
unofficial policy of not becoming involved in misdemeanors. To this
degree, if this is now upgraded to a felony, the Justice Department feels
that it could get greater support of the resources of the FBI in tracking
down these people."''
On the question of the degree of knowledge required to convict a
violator, Congressman Madigan of Illinois asked Mikulski the following
hypothetical question:
In the event that the owner of some hazardous waste contracts
with a trucking company to dispose of that waste, and the
trucking company disposes of it in an illegal and felonious
manner, I should like to know from the gentlewoman who has
committed the felony. Has it been committed by the trucking
company or by the persons who owned the waste that was to
be disposed of, or by both? "1
The response was provided not by Mikulski but by Congressman
Florio who replied:
Of course, the whole question will be determined by a court,
and the feeling is that, on the actual person who violates the
standard, which is reckless disregard, who should have known
of the inappropriateness of the disposal. Obviously, these are
factual matters and we have had instances in the past whereby
someone has had a release ostensibly absolving them from any
responsibility for inappropriate disposal; under this statute, of
course, and a very strict standard of law in the criminal statutes,
there will be a need to go beyond just the front of the release
to find out whether that individual should have had knowledge
as to the accuracy of adequacy of the disposal producer. So in
effect what I am suggesting, not a direct answer, a factual
determination will have to be made by the law enforcement
agencies through the indictment process.'
Madigan was not satisfied with the answer provided by Florio. Ma-
digan then rephrased the question:
150. Id. at 3368.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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All I am concerned about is that, if someone in good faith
hires the services of a second party to dispose of hazardous
waste under the impression that it is going to be disposed of
in a legal way whether or not that person has any further
responsibility under this particular amendment once the hazard-
ous waste leaves his or her property. 54
Florio responded:
If the gentlewoman will yield further, the language of the amend-
ments in defining "reckless disregard" states that the individual
knows of existing circumstances, if he is aware that a substantial
risk does exist, but disregarded that risk. Obviously, this is
general language but of course we are always dealing with general
language. It is a factual situation. The law enforcement officials
will make a determination as to whether that individual was
sufficiently callous in his disregard of the risk. It seems to me
to use the example the gentleman used, if in fact one has an
awareness of the hazardous propensities of a particular chemical,
knows of the difficulties associated with disposal, and one not-
withstanding that sells those materials to someone who comes
up in a pickup truck and that person gives him a release, that
very well may be, notwithstanding the conditions of the release
that could be construed as reckless disregard.'
The response seems to treat actual knowledge and reckless disregard
identically. However, it actually implies that when the facts indicate that
the defendant knew about many of the circumstances which would lead
one to believe that a criminal violation is occurring or has occurred and
the person does not stop the illegal activity, actual knowledge can be
inferred. The key here is that there is some degree of knowledge that
circumstances and the activity could cause harm to people and the
environment. This argument is further supported by the Legislative His-
tory of the 1984 Amendment to RCRA:
The term "knowing" includes the concept of "willful blindness,"
so that it will not be possible for someone to avoid criminal
responsibility by deliberately remaining ignorant about the ma-
terial conditions and requirements of permits and of interim
status regulation. The Judiciary Committee's amendment pre-
cludes any argument that section 3008(d)(2) imposes strict crim-
inal liability and ensures the continuation of the culpability
requirement of that provision. 15 6
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Legislative History Pub. L. No. 98-616, 9, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5576, 5644
(citation omitted).
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Similarly, under RCRA's criminal statute (42 U.S.C. § 6928), knowledge
is required and is spelled out explicitly in the statute. 5 7 However, knowl-
157. The statute itself provides:
Any person who-
(1) knowingly transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste
identified or listed under this subchapter to a facility which does not have a
permit under this subchapter, or pursuant to title I of the Marine Protection,
Research, and Sanctuaries Act (86 Stat. 1052) [33 U.S.C.A. 1411 et seq.],
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or
listed under this subchapter-
(A) without a permit under this subchapter or pursuant to title I of the
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (86 Stat. 1052) [33
U.S.C.A. 1411 et seq.]; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such
permit; or
(C) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of any
applicable interim status regulations or standards;
(3) knowingly omits material information or makes any false material state-
ment or representation in any application, label, manifest, record, report, permit,
or other document filed, maintained, or used for purposes of compliance with
regulations promulgated by the Administrator (or by a State in the case of an
authorized State program) under this subchapter;
(4) knowingly generates, stores, treats transports, disposes of, exports, or
otherwise handles any hazardous waste or any used oil not identified or listed
as a hazardous waste under this subchapter (whether such activity took place
before or takes place after November 8, 1984) and who knowingly destroys,
alters, conceals, or fails to file any record, application, manifest, report, or
other document required to be maintained or filed for purposes of compliance
with regulations promulgated by the Administrator (or by a State in the case
of an authorized State program) under this subchapter;
(5) knowingly transports without a manifest, or causes to be transported
without a manifest, any hazardous waste or any used oil not identified or listed
as a hazardous waste under this subchapter required by regulations promulgated
under this subchapter (or by a State in the case of a State program authorized
under this subchapter) to be accompanied by a manifest;
(6) knowingly exports a hazardous waste identified or listed under this sub-
chapter
(A) without the consent of the receiving country or,
(B) where there exists an international agreement between the United States
and the government of the receiving country establishing notice, export,
and enforcement procedures for the transportation, treatment, storage,
and disposal of hazardous wastes, in a manner which is not in con-
formance with such agreement; or
(7) knowingly stores, treats, transports, or causes to be transported, disposes
of, or otherwise handles any used oil not identified or listed as a hazardous
waste under this subchapter-
(A) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of a
permit under this subchapter; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of any
applicable regulations or standards under this chapter; shall, upon
conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $50,000 for each
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edge does not require certainty; a defendant acts knowingly if he is
aware "that the result is practically certain to follow from his conduct,
whatever his desire may be to that result."' 58
To some courts, proving the requisite knowledge is not difficult." 9
The RCRA statute at issue sets forth certain procedures transporters
must follow to ensure that waste is sent only to facilities with permits;
all transporters are presumed to be aware of these procedures.16 Con-
sequently, a corporate official can be convicted of violating 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(d)(2)(a) if he: (1) knowingly disposes of hazardous waste or
causes others to dispose of a chemical waste and the substance is listed
as hazardous by the EPA, (2) knows that the chemical waste had the
potential to be harmful to others or to the environment and was not
an innocuous substance like water, and (3) had not obtained a permit.' 6'
Similarly, where the corporate official knows what the hazardous waste
is and knows that the disposal site has no permit, he can be convicted
of violating 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1). 1 2 There is a great deal of dispute
about whether the violator must have knowledge that no permit has
been obtained. Many courts have stated that no such knowledge is
necessary. 63 It is those courts' interpretation that, under RCRA and in
this regulatory context, a defendant acts knowingly if he willfully fails
to determine the permit status of the facility.'" Furthermore, the judge
or jury may draw inferences from all of the attendant circumstances,
including the existence of a regulatory scheme. 6
In attempting to crystalize exactly what the "knowledge" requirement
is in criminal RCRA actions, the courts have actually further blurred
an already gray line. For example, in United States v. Dee,'"6 three
federal officials were convicted on four counts of illegally storing, treat-
ing and disposing of hazardous waste without a permit. The appellants
day of violation, or imprisonment not to exceed two years (five years
in the case of a violation of paragraph (1) or (2)), or both. If the
conviction is for a violation committed after a first conviction of such
person under this paragraph, the maximum punishment under the
respective paragraph shall be doubled with respect to both fine and
imprisonment.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1988).
158. United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1504 (lth Cir. 1986), quoting
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445, 98 S. Ct. 2864, 2877
(1978), and Wayne LaFave & Austin Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 196 (1972).
159. Hayes Int'l, 786 F.2d at 1514.
160. Id.
161. United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447, 1450 (lth Cir. 1988).
162. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 664-65 (3d Cir. 1984).
163. United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989).
164. Hayes Int'l, 786 F.2d at 1504.
165. Id. at 1505; see also Greer, 850 F.2d at 1453; Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d
at 669.
166. 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990).
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were civilian employees, engineers, of the United States Army at Aber-
deen Proving Ground in Aberdeen, Maryland. They appealed their con-
victions, alleging that they did not knowingly commit a crime and that
they were unaware that the chemicals they managed were hazardous
waste. While the court acknowledged that ignorance of the law was no
excuse,' 67 the court went one step further noting:
"[W]here as here . . . dangerous or deleterious devices or prod-
ucts or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability
of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is
in possession of them ... must be presumed to be aware of
the regulation." Therefore, the government did not need to prove
defendants knew the violation of RCRA was a crime, nor that
regulations existed listing and identifying the chemical wastes as
RCRA hazardous waste.'"
Yet, in 1991, the First Circuit determined in United States v. MacDonald
& Watson Waste Oil Co., 69 that presumed knowledge is not enough to
convict someone of violating RCRA. In MacDonald & Watson, the
prosecution admitted that the government had no direct evidence that
one of the defendants actually knew of the illegal shipments of hazardous
waste for which the defendant was convicted. Rather, the prosecution
argued that the defendant was the president and owner of the corporation
that transported the illegal shipments and was a hands-on manager of
a relatively small firm. 70 Further, the government argued that the de-
fendant, as the responsible corporate officer, was in a position to ensure
that the company complied with RCRA but failed to do so in spite of
two separate warnings from a consultant that other shipments of toluene-
contaminated soil had been received from other customers. The gov-
ernment concluded that such failure violated the permit which had been
issued. '"
The trial court agreed with the government. However, the First
Circuit reversed, outlining that actual knowledge-not presumptive
knowledge-was required. The circuit court supported its argument by
reasoning that the cases relied upon to develop the responsible corporate
officer doctrine-namely, United States v. Dotterweich72 and United
States v. Park'7 -were actually misdemeanor cases. Moreover, the cases
167. Id. at 745.
168. Id., quoting United States v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563,
91 S. Ct. 1697, 1701 (1971).
169. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
170. Id. at 50.
1.71. Id.
172. 320 U.S. 277, 64 S. Ct. 134 (1943).
173. 421 U.S. 658, 95 S. Ct. 1903 (1975).
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were prosecuted under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,17 4 relating to
the handling or shipping of misbranded drugs or food. The statute
applied in Dotterweich and Park, however, had no knowledge require-
ment. Conversely, the knowledge requirement is expressly provided in
RCRA.' 7 ' From a policy perspective, the court reasoned further that
actual knowledge is especially needed "where, as here, the crime is a
felony carrying possible imprisonment of five years and, for a second
offense, ten.' 7 6 The court then held, "We have found no case, and
the government cites none, where a jury was instructed that the defendant
could be convicted of a federal crime expressly requiring knowledge as
an element, solely by reason of a conclusive or 'mandatory' presumption
of knowledge of the facts constituting the offense.""'
MacDonald & Watson articulates a view that is completely opposite
that of the view taken by most other courts. MacDonald & Watson
takes the contrary view that actual and not presumptive knowledge is
required to convict someone under a statute where the "knowledge"
element is explicitly mentioned in the statute. If this view is adopted
by other circuits, it will be much more difficult for the government to
convict corporate officers. The government will no longer be able to
rely upon the collective knowledge of employees to establish circum-
stantial knowledge. Instead, each corporate officer's knowledge will have
to be individually identified.
C. RCRA's "Knowing Endangerment" Statute
Congress' commitment to the environment is further exemplified by
its establishment of the knowing endangerment criminal sanction recently
implemented by RCRA and the CWA. 7 1 In 1980, Congress enacted the
knowing endangerment provision of RCRA.7 9 The purpose of this pro-
vision was to provide enhanced felony penalties for certain life-threat-
ening conduct, while at the same time assuring to the fullest extent
possible that persons were not prosecuted or convicted unjustly for
making difficult business decisions where such judgments were not made
with the necessary scienter.18° Initially, the House of Representatives
174. 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988)).
175. United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 52 (1st Cir.
1991).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 53; see also United States v. White, No. CR-90-228-AAM, 1991 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 5567 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 28, 1991) (actual knowledge under RCRA required to
convict).
178. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1988); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1988).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e).
180. See the Legislative History Pub. L. No. 96-482 at 37-38, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5036-37.
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proposed amending RCRA to include a general reckless endangerment
provision. 8' However, the House bill was rejected by the Senate. Con-
sequently, the conference committee suggested a substitute proposal es-
tablishing a knowing endangerment provision.8 2 This proposal was
accepted by the Senate. The knowledge required by the knowing en-
dangerment provision is actual knowledge. The actual knowledge can
be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence; however, for
individuals, constructive or vicarious knowledge is insufficient to support
a conviction.'
This knowing endangerment provision makes it an offense to know-
ingly place another person in "imminent danger" of death or serious
bodily injury while committing a predicate offense under 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d) and engaging in conduct that demonstrates a lack of concern
for the individual(s) being endangered.' u "Imminent danger" means "the
existence of a condition or combination of conditions which could
reasonably be expected to cause death or serious bodily injury unless
the condition is remedied."'8 5
Determining whether a person violated 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) requires
a two-step inquiry. The first step involves a showing that the defendant
knowingly engaged in conduct which violates certain prohibitions or
interim standards.'8 If he did so, the next inquiry is whether his knowl-
edge at the time of the violation satisfies one of the two "tiers" of
culpability that may subject him to prosecution for felonious endan-
germent. 8 7 Therefore, the knowledge that the defendant should have
had, could have had, or would have had under various circumstances
does not suffice if he did not actually have the requisite knowledge
about the danger at the time he acted.' According to the legislative
history, it was not Congress' intention "either to create criminal liability
or to impose enhanced penalties for errors in judgment made without
the necessary scienter, however dire may be the danger in fact created."'8 9
Thus, a supervisor who personally lacked the necessary knowledge would
not be criminally liable under the knowing endangerment statute for
knowledge his subordinates possessed.1'g The purpose of the knowing
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. United States v. Protex Indus., Inc., 874 F.2d 740, 744 (10th Cir. 1989).
186. Supra note 180.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 38, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5037-38.
190. Harris, supra note 142, at 212, quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1444, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 37, Legislative History Pub. L. No. 96-482, 40, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5039.
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endangerment provision is to protect the public from knowing and
unjustified conduct which threatens life or serious bodily harm.191 Con-
sequently, a person could be prosecuted under this section even if no
concrete harm actually came to others. 192
There are two types of knowing endangerment provisions. The first
provision covers conduct manifesting an unjustified and inexcusable
disregard for human life. 93 This conduct must include a conscious
disregard for human life that is neither excusable nor justified by coun-
tervailing considerations.' 94 The initial penalty for such a violation was
up to $250,000 fine and/or up to two years in jail. 19 Conduct that is
even more egregious is classified as "manifesting an extreme indifference
to human life."' l This type of conduct was initially punishable by a
fine of up to $250,000 and up to five years imprisonment.'" The penalty
has now been increased to fifteen years imprisonment. 9 An example
of an egregious action would be the dumping of poisonous waste into
what the defendant knows is a drinking water supply. Such an act would
be considered egregious even if death or injury does not result.'" The
need for such stringent penalties was justified by Congresswoman Mik-
ulski:
Hazardous waste violations have had a tremendous effect not
just on a few individuals, but on whole cities and ecosystems.
Because of the dumping of toxic chemicals in Louisville, Ken-
tucky's sewer system, that city's sewage treatment plant was
unable to function properly, causing untreated sewage to enter
into the Ohio River and endanger the drinking water supplies
of cities downriver. The James River, and to a lesser degree
the entire Chesapeake Bay ecosystem, was contaminated because
kepone was dumped into the water.2 "
Because of the severity of the penalties, Congress found it necessary
to make the offense as precise and carefully drawn as possible. 20 ' The
net effect of this concern is that the knowing endangerment charge is
not appropriate when the charge involves second guessing of the wisdom
of judgments made on the basis of what was known at the time, where
191. Supra note 180, at 38, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5038.
192. Id.
193. Id., 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5037.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e).
199. Supra note 180.
200. 126 Cong. Rec., supra note 149.
201. Supra note 180.
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the person acted without the necessary element of scienter or knowl-
edge.2o0
Although supervisors could not be held vicariously liable under thq
RCRA knowing endangerment statute, a different question which arises
out of this context is whether or not a corporation can be held criminally
liable for the acts of its employees under section 6928(e). This question
was recently answered by the Tenth Circuit in the case of United States
v. Protex Industries, Inc.2 3 In Protex, the defendant operated a drum
recycling facility where it purchased and used fifty-five gallon drums,
many of which previously contained toxic materials. 2°4 The defendant
cleaned and repainted the drums and used them to store and ship other
products it manufactured. 2 5 The EPA conducted a two-year investigation
and, ultimately, the corporation was indicted for knowingly placing three
of its employees in imminent danger as a result of inadequate safety
provisions to protect the employees from the toxic chemicals in the
drum recycling facility.2 6
Protex appealed, alleging that RCRA's knowing endangerment pro-
vision is unconstitutionally vague. 20" The court rejected this argument
202. Id.
203. 874 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1989).
204. Id. at 741.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 741-42. Specifically, government experts testified that the employees were
at an increased risk of suffering solvent poisoning.
207. Id. First, Protex argued that the trial court erred in allowing the knowing
endangerment counts to go to the jury, despite the alleged absence of any evidence showing
the employees were placed in imminent danger or faced serious bodily injury as defined
in 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f)(6). Secondly, the defendant alleged that the jury was improperly
instructed that an individual was placed in imminent danger if it could reasonably be
expected that the set of circumstances would cause death or serious bodily injury. This
instruction, the appellant contended, did not track the language of the statute and it
unconstitutionally expanded the definition beyond the intent of Congress. Finally, the
defendants argued that the court erred in refusing to give a requested instruction in
Protex's defense that the government failed to meet its duty to provide results of any
on site inspections to Protex, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 6927(a). The Tenth Circuit
rejected all three of these arguments and affirmed the lower court's conviction.
Specifically, regarding Protex's first argument that the enhanced risk of contracting
some type of indeterminate type of cancer at some unspecified time in the future is not
sufficient to constitute serious bodily injury, the court reasoned that this argument "dem-
onstrate[d] a callousness toward the severe physical effect the prolonged exposure to toxic
chemicals may cause or has caused to the three former employees." Id. at 743. The court
of appeals also failed to recognize Protex's second argument that the phrase "imminent
danger" was unconstitutionally vague and that the legislative history of the statute indicated
an intent on the part of Congress to narrowly restrict the incidences in which a party
may be found guilty of knowing endangerment and to limit its applications only to those
actions which caused the most severe injury. Here, the court acknowledged:
Defendant is unable to articulate why it could have understood that the RCRA
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as it had rejected other similar arguments in the past-on public interest
grounds. Again, the court emphasized balancing the interest of the public
with the chilling effect the statute would have on corporations. The
court saw no ambiguity in the statute and reasoned that corporations
can be convicted vicariously under RCRA's knowing endangerment stat-
ute for actions of their employees.
D. Other Issues Raised Under RCRA
1. Defining "Owner" or "Operator"
As under the CWA, the issue of whether one is required to be an
owner or operator in order to be found criminally liable has also arisen
under RCRA. The jurisprudence indicates that the definition of "owner"
or "operator" under RCRA could be a bit more expansive than it is
under either the CWA or the Clean Air Act (CAA). In United States
v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.,2°8 the defendant corporation and two of its
employees, a foreman and the service manager in the trucking depart-
ment, were indicted for illegally pumping hazardous waste from the
company's plant into a trench without a RCRA permit. According to
the indictment, federal agents saw workers pump waste into the trench
over a three-day period, and on the third day observed toxic chemicals
flowing into the creek.
Johnson and Towers pled guilty to the RCRA counts, while the
employees pled not guilty and moved to dismiss the three RCRA counts
against them. The employees specifically argued that the word "person"
as used under the act should be interpreted narrowly because in two
forbade it from placing its employees in a situation "substantially certain" to
cause danger of death or serious bodily injury, but why it could not have
understood that it should not place its employees in situations "reasonably
expected" to cause death or serious bodily injury. ... The gist of the "knowing
endangerment" provision of the RCRA is that a party will be criminally liable
if, in violating other provisions of the RCRA, it places others in danger of
great harm and it has knowledge of that danger.
Id. at 744.
The appellant's third contention that Protex should have received the results of the
EPA's 1984 and 1985 investigation prior to the 1986 indictment was also rejected by the
court which held:
Any information the government might provide pursuant to its duty under
section 6927 to Protex was simply surplusage for purposes of Protex's potential
criminal liability. Further, even if the government had notified Protex of the
violations discovered after the 1984 and 1985 inspections, Protex's subsequent
remedial activity would not have abrogated its criminal liability for those viol-
ations. Instead, it would only help to prevent further criminal violations.
Id. at 746.
208. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984).
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similar statutes, the CAA and the CWA, Congress added to its definition
of "person" the category of "any responsible corporate officer," thus
raising some doubt as to whether "person" was to be given its common
sense meaning. The United States District Court of New Jersey agreed
with the employees' interpretation and concluded that the RCRA criminal
provisions applied only to "owners and operators," i.e., those obligated
under the statute to obtain a permit. Consequently, the district court
held that since neither employee was an owner or operator, the motion
to dismiss the ICRA charges would be granted. On appeal, the Third
Circuit reversed the lower court and remanded the case without actually
tackling the alleged inconsistencies between the CAA/CWA and RCRA.
0
To be convicted under RCRA, the person need only be an officer,
that is, a person capable of making decisions on behalf of or within
the company.210 However, an employee without decisionmaking authority
cannot be convicted as an owner or operator under RCRA. Having the
ability to make a decision does not mean that the officer must make
a knowing decision to be convicted. The status of an individual's knowl-
edge is irrelevant in the scheme of determining who is an "owner or
operator."
This raises the issue of what constitutes "capable of making deci-
sions." Several potential scenarios come to mind. Under RCRA, the
following persons could be considered operators:
(a) persons who are intimately versed in and responsible for
corporate operations where the offenses occurred;2 1'
(b) persons who have direct responsibility for day-to-day op-
erations;
(c) persons responsible for filing environmental compliance forms;
(d) persons involved in submitting applications for permits. 212
In short, it must be shown that a person had direct responsibility for
the activities that are alleged to be illegal. Simply being an officer or
209. The court noted:
Without passing on the meaning of "any person" in the Clean Air or Clean
Water Act, which are not the subject of this appeal, we note that the addition
in those acts of "any responsible officer" seems to expand rather than limit
the class of potential defendants. As the Supreme Court said in United States
v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 282, 64 S. Ct. 134, 137 (1943), an exercise of
draftsmanship intended to broaden the scope of a criminal provision "can hardly
be found ground for relieving from such liability the individual agents of the
corporation."
Id. at 665 n.3.
210. United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 50 (1st Cir.
1991).
211. United States v. Baytank, Inc., 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991).
212. Id.
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even the president of a corporation is not enough. The government must
prove that the person had a responsibility to supervise the activities in
question. 213
2. Defining "Hazardous Waste"
RCRA also defines the term "hazardous waste" for purposes of
corporate criminal liability rather expansively. In many cases, defendants
have attempted to argue that materials in question were not waste since
they were still usable. 214 Those defendants did not fully understand the
principles of RCRA. Broadly, RCRA sets forth different types of haz-
ardous waste. On one hand, there are wastes listed by the EPA as
hazardous.2 1 5 On the other hand, there are wastes that have characteristics
which make them hazardous. 216
Determining when a hazardous substance becomes waste can cause
some problems under RCRA. The EPA commentary indicates that haz-
ardous substances become hazardous waste when "their intended use
has ceased and they begin to be accumulated or stored for disposal, re-
use or reclamation. ' 21 7 The material also becomes waste when it has
been used for its intended purpose, and is either discarded or can no
longer be used for that purpose. " ' Finally, if the expiration date has
been reached on a hazardous substance, the substance may become a
hazardous waste. Failure to have the requisite RCRA permit under any
of these circumstances could subject a corporate officer to criminal
liability. 219
213. Id.
214. United States v. Dee, 912 F. 2d 741, 747 (4th Cir. 1990); Connecticut v. Uretek,
Inc., 543 A.2d 709 (1988).
215. 40 C.F.R. § 261.30-261.33 (1990).
216. 40 C.F.R. § 261.20-261.24 (1990).
217. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,095 col. 3 (1980); Uretek, 543 A.2d at 716.
218. Uretek, 543 A.2d at 716.
219. United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 746-77 (4th Cir. 1990). Also see Uretek, 543
A.2d 709. In Uretek, the defendants, Uretek and its vice president were convicted of
knowingly storing hazardous waste without a permit in violation of state RCRA laws.
The defendants were convicted under the following statute:
Any person who knowingly transports hazardous waste to a facility which does
not have a permit required under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976, or who knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste
without a permit required under said act, or who knowingly violates any material
condition or requirement of such permit, shall be fined not more than fifty
thousand dollars for each day of violation or imprisoned not more than two
years or both.
Uretek, 543 A.2d at 710 n.l. On appeal, the appellants argued that there was insufficient
evidence to convict them because the state failed to prove that solvents stored in the
drums were "spent." The Supreme Court of Connecticut determined that although there
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V. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN SEEKINO CRIMNAL SANCTIONS
Probably the most frequent complaint raised by corporations and
corporate officials during RCRA and CWA prosecutions has been the
lack of uniformity and guidance by prosecutors and the Justice De-
partment as to what constitutes a criminal violation of the environmental
laws. Under general Department of Justice policy, prosecutors have
almost unbounded discretion in making such decisions n0 The federal
government has wide latitude in determining when, whom, how, and
even whether to prosecute for apparent violations of federal criminal
law. 22l Corporate officials perceive this wide latitude as a problem causing
prosecutors to become more concerned with prosecuting than with com-
pliance. m
For example, in the criminal environmental context the Justice De-
partment and the EPA have primarily concentrated on false reporting
cases and cases where the violators have failed to obtain the permits
was no regulation which officially defined the word "spent," the court could nevertheless
rely upon the EPA commentary concerning the interpretation of RCRA and its regulation.
Here, the court began with the Congressional premise that for those materials which are
listed as spent solvents, they generally become spent materials when their intended use
has ceased and when they begin to be stored for disposal, re-use, or reclamation.
The Connecticut Supreme Court then held that "a solvent is spent when it has been
used for its original intended purpose, and is either (a) discarded or (b) can no longer
be used for that purpose" and noted that:
Uretek's proposed definition of "spent" solvent would allow a generator or
user of hazardous waste to store such material indefinitely as long as there is
a remote possibility that it might be reused in the distant future. Such a
construction of "spent" is clearly inconsistent with the Congressional goal in
the RCRA of providing "cradle to grave" regulation of hazardous wastes.
Id. at 716.
220. McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1161.
221. Id., quoting United States Department of Justice, Principles of Prosecution (1980).
222. As noted by James Frezzo, one of the convicted brothers in United States v.
Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979),
If the environmental control agencies would come forward and tell business this
is what we want, this is what we need, and then put a deadline on it ...
you'd have to be a complete fool not to comply. You cannot operate a business
in underhanded methods daily.... So rather than spending all the time and
money trying to put a case together like you're going first to prosecute us, if
they would have loaned that amount of money when I asked for it, we would
have solved the problem then.
The Environmental Protection Agency should have had an area meeting with
the mushroom industry, explained to the growers: "This is what the problem
is, this is what the guidelines are" . . . give the grower 90 or 180 days to come
in compliance. I compare it to driving down the highway .... You see the sign
that says 55 miles an hour, and you're driving 65, you know you're breaking
the law. But if there's no sign, how do you know when you break the law?
DiMento, supra note 52, at 4.
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required by law. These types of prosecutions are high priority because
they have the ability to affect the entire environmental regulatory pro-
gram. 2 4 Depending upon the specific policy considerations, prosecutors
use their broad discretion when determining the remedy or punishment
to seek. The government can seek either civil or criminal sanctions. Yet,
some government officials seek civil sanctions for egregious violations
while others seek criminal sanctions for rather minor infractions. This
inconsistency spawns the criticism by corporate officials.
There is indeed merit in both the government's and the corporate
officials' arguments for and against the use of criminal sanctions. In
facing potential criminal sanctions, corporations are compelled to take
steps to comply with environmental laws. Corporations must recognize
that unlike other crimes, the devastation of the environment has far-
reaching and long-lasting effects on everyone. As noted by United States
District Court Judge Charles Allen in United States v. Distler,25 "Busi-
nessmen and industries who pollute our environment are guilty of great
crimes against man, nature and themselves. " 26 If allowed to continue,
these crimes would create "effects ... irreversible by any known tech-
nology."2 7 Corporations must also realize that the public takes these
crimes very seriously. The National Survey of Crime Severity, sponsored
by the Justice Department, conducted a poll in 1977 and asked 60,000
people to rank the seriousness of criminal activity. Participants ranked
a pollution incident resulting in deaths as the seventh most severe crime,
ahead of crimes like skyjacking and drug smuggling. In fact, pollution
of a city's water system in which there were no specified adverse health
results ranked sixty-fourth, ahead of roughly seventy other crimes.22
On the other hand, prosecutors must give more weight to the term
"good faith" when they determine whether or not they intend to seek
criminal or civil sanctions against corporate officials. If the Department
of Justice falls to give more guidance to its prosecutors, the potential
for overly zealous prosecutors will remain. Rather than deter corporate
officials from violating environmental laws, prosecutors would then ac-
tually "chill" the behavior of corporations that do comply. This chilling
effect is real, as evidenced by comments made by one of the prosecutors
in United States v. Frezzo Brothers.29 The prosecutor in that case stated,
223. McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 15, at 1162.
224. Id.
225. 671 F.2d 954 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1069, 102 S. Ct. 118, reh'g denied,
454 U.S. 1069, 102 S. Ct. 619 (1981).
226. DiMento, supra note 52, at 7.
227. Id.
228. Henry Habicht, II, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforce-
ment, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. '10478 n.64 (Dec. 1987).
229. United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979).
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"I think that a lot depends on the prosecutor's inclination. I developed
a view that pollution incidents were almost always willful."' '  In short,
without some type of internal policy or standards as to what "good
faith" means, both corporations and the government may be "grabbing
for straws" to determine its definition.
The Department of Justice recognized the need for clarifying when
a corporation or corporate officer could expect to be criminally pros-
ecuted. On July 1, 1991, the department issued a position paper entitled
"Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for Environmental Viol-
ations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or Disclosure
Efforts by the Violator." 231 One of the reasons for issuing the paper
was that many companies attempted to comply with the law by estab-
lishing intensive internal auditing systems or employing consultants and
lawyers to critique management, systems, and regulatory requirements.
Many prosecutors were using these "voluntary self audits" to prosecute
corporations. Consequently, those that sought to do everything within
their power to bring a facility into compliance actually expanded their
exposure to criminal sanctions.
The Justice Department saw such prosecutions as counterproductive,
and decided that it needed a policy that did "not create a disincentive
to or undermine the goal of encouraging critical self-auditing, self-
policing, and voluntary disclosure. ' 23 2 The memo provided that the
department prosecutors should consider several factors, to the extent
they are applicable, along with other relevant factors when the law and
evidence would be sufficient for prosecution. 23 3 The factors to be con-
sidered are:
A. Voluntary Disclosure
Here it is emphasized that voluntary disclosure is considered
if the disclosure is complete, timely, and voluntary. The de-
partment also considers whether the person came forward
promptly after discovering the non-compliance and the quantity
and quality of information provided. Particular consideration is
given when the disclosure substantially aides the government
investigation and the disclosure is made before a law enforcement
or regulatory authority obtains knowledge of the noncompliance.
If a disclosure is required by law, regulation, or permit, it is
not considered voluntary.
B. Cooperation
After a voluntary disclosure or even after the government has
230. DiMento, supra note 52, at 4.
231. Hereinafter the memorandum shall be referred to as July 1 Memo.
232. July 1 Memo.
233. Id. at 2.
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learned of a violation, the Justice Department looks favorably
on those individuals who fully and promptly cooperate.
C. Preventive Measures and Compliance Programs
The Justice Department also looks favorably on those cor-
porations that have regular, intensive, and comprehensive en-
vironmental compliance programs. They emphasize the importance
of having a compliance or audit program which includes suf-
ficient measures to identify and prevent future noncompliance,
and whether the program was adopted in a good faith and
timely manner. In reviewing the compliance or audit program,
the Justice Department will ask:
1. Was there a strong institutional policy to comply with
all environmental requirements?
2. Have safeguards beyond those required by existing law
been developed and implemented to prevent non-compliance
from occurring?
3. Were there regular procedures, including internal or
external compliance and management audits, to detect, pre-
vent, and remedy circumstances like those that led to the
noncompliance?
4. Were there procedures and safeguards to ensure the
integrity of any audit conducted?
5. Did the audit evaluate all sources of pollution (i.e., all
media), including the possibility of cross-media transfers of
pollutants?
6. Were the auditor's recommendations implemented in a
timely fashion?
7. Were adequate resources committed to the auditing pro-
gram and to implementing its recommendations? and
8. Was environmental compliance a standard by which
employee and corporate departmental performance was
judged?2' 4
Justice Department prosecutors were also instructed to consider the
persuasiveness of non-compliance-whether internal disciplinary action
was taken and the subsequent compliance efforts made.
To further clear up any ambiguities, the department gave an example
of a situation which satisfied the foregoing criteria and merited con-
sequent prosecutorial leniency:
1. Company A regularly conducts a comprehensive audit of
its compliance with environmental requirements.
234. Id. at 3-5.
I.. . . . . . . . . .
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2. The audit uncovers information about employees' dispos-
ing of hazardous wastes by dumping them in an unpermitted
location.
3. An internal company investigation confirms the audit in-
formation. (Depending upon the nature of the audit, this follow-
up investigation may be unnecessary.)
4. Prior to the violations the company had a sound com-
pliance program, which included clear policies, employee train-
ing, and a hotline for suspected violations.
5. As soon as the company confirms the violations, it dis-
closes all pertinent information to the appropriate government
agency; it undertakes compliance planning with that agency; and
it carries out satisfactory remediation measures.
6. The company also undertakes to correct any false infor-
mation previously submitted to the government in relation to
the violations.
7. Internally the company disciplines the employees actually
involved in the violations, including any supervisor who was lax
in preventing or detecting the activity. Also, the company reviews
its compliance program to determine how the violations slipped
by and corrects the weaknesses found by that review.
8. The company discloses to the government the names of
the employees actually responsible for the violations, and it
cooperates with the government by providing documentation
necessary to the investigation of those persons.
235
According to the Justice Department, under these circumstances, Com-
pany A would stand a good chance of being favorably considered for
prosecutorial leniency, to the extent of not being criminally prosecuted
at all. The degree of any leniency, however, may turn upon other relevant
factors not specifically dealt with in these guidelines.
The department also gave an example where the possibility of pros-
ecutorial leniency was remote:
1. Because an employee has threatened to report a violation
to federal authorities, the company is afraid that investigators
may begin looking at it. An audit is undertaken, but it focuses
only upon the particular violation, ignoring the possibility that
the violation may be indicative of widespread activities in the
organization.
2. After completing the audit, Company Z reports the vio-
lation discovered to the government.
3. The company had a compliance program, but it was ef-
235. Id. at 7-8.
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fectively no more than a collection of paper. No effort is made
to disseminate its content, impress upon employees its signifi-
cance, train employees in its application, or oversee its imple-
mentation.
4. Even after "discovery" of the violation the company makes
no effort to strengthen its compliance procedures.
5. The company makes no effort to come to terms with
regulators regarding its violations. It resists any remedial work
and refuses to pay any monetary sanctions.
6. Because of the non-compliance, information submitted to
regulators over the years has been materially inaccurate, painting
a substantially false picture of the company's true compliance
situation. The company fails to take any steps to correct that
inaccuracy.
7. The company does not cooperate with prosecutors in iden-
tifying those employees (including managers) who actually were
involved in the violation, and it resists disclosure of any doc-
uments relating either to the violations or to the responsible
employees.
23 6
The department also provided further examples which illustrated situa-
tions where the presence, absence, or degree of any criterion may affect
the prosecution's exercise of discretion.2 37
236. Id. at 8-9.
237. The examples given by the Department of Justice were the following:
1. In a situation otherwise similar to that of Company A, above, Company
B performs an audit that is very limited in scope and probably reflects no more
than an effort to avoid prosecution. Despite that background, Company B is
cooperative in terms of both bringing itself into compliance and providing
information regarding the crime and its perpetrators. The result could be any
of a number of outcomes, including prosecution of a lesser charge or a decision
to prosecute the individuals rather than the company.
2. Again the situation is similar to Company A's, but Company C refuses to
reveal any information regarding the individual violators. The likelihood of the
government's prosecuting the company [is] substantially increased.
3. In another situation similar to Company A's, Company D chooses to "sit
on" the audit and take corrective action without telling the government. The
government learns of the situation months or years after the fact.
A complicating fact here is that environmental regulatory programs are self
policing; they include a substantial number of report requirements. If reports
which in fact presented false information are allowed to stand uncorrected, the
reliability of this system is undermined. They also may lead to adverse and
unfair impacts upon other members of the regulated community. For example,
Company D failed to report discharges of X contaminant into a municipal sewer
system, discharges that were terminated as a result of an audit. The sewer
authority, though, knowing only that there have been excessive loadings of X,
but not knowing that Company D was a source, tightens limitations upon all
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Interestingly, the Department of Justice refused to state that the
criteria used must be followed by prosecutors. Moreover, although fol-
lowing the exact recommendations of the memorandum may protect a
corporate officer from the potential of criminal sanctions, the corpo-
ration or corporate officer is still subject to civil fines and penalties.
Also, the voluntary audit and disclosure may be used by the government
if such information is revealed to them.
known sources of X. Thus, all those sources incur additional treatment expenses,
but Company D is unaffected. Had Company D revealed its audit results, the
other companies would not have suffered unnecessary expenses.
In some situations, moreover, failure to report is a crime. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.
§ 2321(b)(5) and 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b). To illustrate the effect of this factor,
consider Company E, which conducts a thorough audit and finds that hazardous
wastes have been disposed of by dumping them on the ground. The company
cleans up the area and tightens up its compliance program, but does not reveal
the situation to regulators. Assuming that a reportable quantity of a legal
obligation under 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) to report that release as soon as it had
knowledge of it, thereby allowing regulators the opportunity to assure proper
clean up. Company E's knowing failure to report the release upon learning of
it is itself a felony.
In the case of both Company D and Company E, consideration would be
given by prosecutors for remedial efforts; hence prosecution of fewer or lesser
charges might result. However, because Company D's silence adversely affected
others who are entitled to fair regulatory treatment and because Company E
derived those legally responsible for evaluating cleanup needs of the ability to
carry out their functions, the likelihood of their totally escaping criminal pros-
ecution is significantly reduced.
4.. Company F's situation is similar to that of Company B. However, with
regard to the various violations shown by the audit, it concentrates upon cor-
recting only the easier, less expensive, less significant among them. Its lacka-
daisical approach to correction does not make it a strong candidate for leniency.
5. Company G is similar to Company D in that it performs an audit and
finds violations, but does not bring them to the government's attention. Those
violations do not involve failures to comply with reporting requirements. The
company undertakes a program of gradually correcting its violations. When the
government learns of the situation, Company G still has not remedied its most
significant violations, but claims that it certainly planned to get to them. Com-
pany G could receive some consideration for its efforts, but its failure to disclose
and the slowness of its remedial work probably means that it cannot expect a
substantial degree of leniency.
6. Comprehensive audits are considered positive efforts toward good faith
compliance. However, such audits are not indispensable to enforcement leniency.
Company H's situation is essentially identical to that of Company A, except
for the fact that it does not undertake a comprehensive audit. It does not have
a formal audit program, but, as part of its efforts to ensure compliance, does
realize that it is committing an environmental violation. It thereafter takes steps
otherwise identical to those of Company A in terms of compliance efforts and
cooperation. Company H is also a likely candidate for leniency, including possibly
no criminal prosecution.
Id. at 10-13.
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To ensure removing a facility or corporate officials from potential
criminal liability, corporations should also consider: (1) a declaration
by management that compliance with all environmental laws and re-
gulations is a top corporate priority; (2) development of an internal
reporting system to assure that the responsible officers are fully informed
as to the statutes of compliance with pollution control laws and regu-
lations so that they can make the necessary efforts to achieve and
maintain compliance; (3) development of an external reporting system
to assure corporate compliance with all reporting or disclosure obliga-
tions; and (4) establishment of educational programs for all potentially
affected individuals, from the chief executive officer down to low-level
employees. '38 Such educational programs might include periodic classes
or seminars on the relevant requirements and issuance and regular update
of corporate environmental policy manuals.2 3 9 The objective is to make
it obvious to prosecutors that despite the violation, the corporation is
taking steps to correct the problem.
VI. CoNcLusIoN
For the first time, the general public is beginning to take seriously
the imminent threat of polluted waters and a polluted environment. As
a result of the recent oil spills such as the Exxon disaster in Valdez,
Alaska, and the virtually simultaneous spills in Delaware, Pennsylvania,
and Texas, the public outcry for more stringent penalties has been louder
than ever before. Consequently, the government is attempting to respond
by implementing stronger criminal penalties, such as the increased felony
sanctions and the implementation of the knowing endangerment statutes
under the CWA and RCRA. However, one questions whether Congress
and the Justice Department have adequately explained who will be
prosecuted under RCRA and the CWA. Further, one wonders how the
laws will be implemented, and whether they will deter corporate violations
of land and water environmental statutes. Only time will answer these
questions and ultimately determine whether corporate violators will be
held accountable for their unlawful assaults on the environment rather
than be allowed to absorb civil penalties as just another cost of doing
business.
238. Tennille, supra note 61, at 22.
239. Id.
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